would not only have to wage war with the tribes who already were visibly in arms against the Roman People, but also to bring the whole country of Gaul beneath our sway'.
The Campaign
There has been much discussion as to the actual route of the Helvetii. For them to reach their destination in the west of Gaul there were two points of exit from Switzerland-the northern passes over the Jura would take them out of their direct line, hence they chose that which lay through the province in preference to the narrow pass which followed the right bank of the Rh6ne and debouched into the lands of the Sequani, who not unnaturally feared the passage of so large a host. Caesar refused their request for leave to cross the province after he had gained an interval of ten or eleven days, till 9 April, for consideration, and used it in raising levies and fortifying the most important points along the 19 miles of river-bank between Lake Geneva and the Pas de l'Ecluse. Attempts to pass these lines failed and the Helvetii were forced to take the Sequanian route. The internal state of Gaul was responsible for their being able to do this; Caesar realized previously the hostility of the Allobroges and the danger they might cause if the Helvetii marched through them (i. 6)-he was now to learn that the anti-Roman faction of the Aedui had persuaded the already hostile Sequani to give them permission to go through the narrow gap. Recognizing the inadequacy of his forces, he left Labienus in charge of his lines, returned to his Cisalpine troops, mustered them, and after forced marches over Mont Genevre through Dauphiny, crossed the Rh6ne at its junction with the Sa6ne (Flumen Arar), to learn that the Helvetii had threaded their way through the pass and the Sequani, had crossed the Sa6ne, and were ravaging the lands of Rome's allies, the Aedui.
This gave Caesar his pretext and motive for future operations. There was still a force of Tigurini on the east bank of the Sa6ne, and they were the first to feel the weight of his arm, after a night march which he made to attack them in the valley of the Formans, a few miles north of the river junction. The alarm of the Helvetii amounted to panic when they saw their pursuer cross in one day a river whose passage had occupied them nearly twenty, and they tried to open negotiations which Caesar rejected. So the march went on northwards for fifteen days, with barely five or six miles separating the forces, in spite of Caesar's difficulties with his Gallic cavalry and his supplies of food. Used to the Mediterranean climate in which corn is a winter crop, he was soon feeling a shortage, augmented to a certain extent by the intrigues of Dumnorix whose sympathies all lay with the Helvetii.
The pro-Roman party led by Diviciacus and Liscus revealed the state of affairs, but so awkward was Caesar's situation that he was forced to patch up a reconciliation, at the same time giving orders that Dumnorix should be watched. A carefully planned concerted movement between Caesar and Labienus 130,000 Helvetii had meanwhile retreated northwards to the territory of the Lingones between Auxerre and Dijon, but Caesar's messages forbade help being given to them. After a three days' halt he followed up to see that his instructions were being carried out, and on the way was met by envoys whose pleas for mercy he respected. Six thousand made an abortive attempt to reach the Rhine but were brought back and as Caesar meaningly says 'treated as enemies!' How to deal with the Helvetii was Caesar's next problem; the Germans would be only too willing to occupy the vacant lands-a situation Rome could not tolerate-so the emigrants were ordered back to Switzerland and provision provided for them by the Allobroges: i io,oo returned. The Boii, whose valour the Aedui recognized and possibly hoped to use, were settled in Aeduan territory, most likely to the south-west, and in the end treated by them as equals.
The position of Caesar was a curious one; he had no expressed authority to be beyond the borders of his province, he had come unexpectedly into a position in which the Gauls looked upon him as the arbiter of their fate, and he risked being entangled in their internal conflicts. The Gallic chieftains assembled to congratulate him, and put him in a situation from which he could not withdraw without loss of prestige to Rome. The information they gave him in a secret meeting was so startling that he might well be nervous as to the next step. For centuries the Romans had had rather nightmare fears about the northern tribes: the early Gallic invasions had been unpleasantly recalled to mind by the Cimbri and Teutoni; these had given place to the Germans in popular fancy. What the Gauls told him about them gave a clue to the grim background of Gallic politics. Ariovistus had come into Gaul some time before 63 B.c.-the actual date is uncertain, some authorities putting it as early as 7I B.C.-when the Arverni and Sequani had foolishly invited him to help them against the Aedui. Only 15,00o had at first crossed the Rhine: the defeat of the Aedui had put the Sequani in the power of their enemies, for Ariovistus had settled in their territory, and had taken a third of their lands for an additional 23,000 invaders. In fact, the Gauls went in fear and trembling of Ariovistus and only dared to complain to the Romans in secret.
The German leader was in a strong position. He had received official recognition from the Senate in an honorific title, he had a large army to face Caesar's comparatively small one, and his own prestige in Gaul was great. He could afford therefore to return a contemptuous answer to Caesar's first embassy, which was sent when Caesar realized the danger that the Germans might cause to Rome's possessions as soon as they became accustomed to crossing the Rhine and carrying their arms farther afield. Ariovistus refused a personal interview and inquired what business it was of the Romans. Caesar replied by quoting the Senate's decree of 61 B.C. instructing him to protect the Aeduan interests and added to it an ultimatum,
